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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of a continuum of industries in which
some industries are monopolistically competitive, the others are oligopolis-
tic, and they interact in a labor market. We use this model to examine
the eects of an increase in the number of oligopolistic rms. We rst
show that this raises the equilibrium wage and induces exit of monop-
olistically competitive rms. Then, we nd that the prots of each
oligopolistic rm and the whole oligopolistic industry decrease. Fi-
nally, we establish that if the elasticity of substitution is the same
in all industries, welfare improves as a result of an increase in the
oligopolistic rms.
Keywords: Monopolistic competition, oligopoly, general equilibrium,
entry, welfare
JEL classication: D43, L13, L40
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1 Introduction
Are increased entry and/or competition benecial? This is a classical ques-
tion in economics, but the answer is mixed. For instance, in Cournot com-
petition with identical rms, `when the number of rms becomes very large,
the market price tends to the competitive price,' (Tirole, 1988, p. 220) and
hence increased competition is desirable in terms of welfare.1 While this re-
sult has provided a theoretical rationale for competition policy, it rests on a
partial equilibrium analysis and ignores the eects on the other industries.
This paper examines the eect of entry in a general equilibrium model
where oligopolistic and monopolistic competition coexists. For this purpose,
we incorporate monopolistic competition into Neary's (2003, 2016) general
oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model. Concretely, we suppose a contin-
uum of industries on a unit interval, some of which are oligopolistic and the
others of which are monopolistically competitive. And, these industries use
a common factor of production, labor. Thus, entry modeled by an exogenous
increase in the number of oligopolistic rms has an eect on income distri-
bution and welfare through a change in the wage rate that clears the labor
market. While Neary (2003, 2016) assumes that all industries are oligopolis-
tic, we relax this assumption and allow some industries to be monopolistically
competitive, which seems more realistic.
In this model, we rst show that an increase in the number of oligopolistic
rms raises the equilibrium wage. Due to this rise in the wage rate, the num-
ber of varieties increases, and the product price rises in the monopolistically
competitive industries. Meanwhile, the product price falls, and the prots of
each individual rm and the whole sector increase in the oligopolistic sectors.
That is, an increase in the number of rms has a pro-competitive eect on
the oligopolistic industries, but an anti-competitive eect on the monopolis-
tically competitive industries. Due to these mixed eects on each industry, it
is generally ambiguous whether welfare improves. However, in the case with
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the same elasticity of substitution in all industries, welfare is shown to rise
as a result of entry in the oligopolistic industries.
This paper is closely related to two strands of literature. The rst con-
cerns the coexistence of oligopolistic and monopolistic competition. To our
knowledge, Shimomura and Thisse (2012) rst formalize the coexistence of
monopolistic competition and oligopoly. Incorporating monopolistically com-
petitive and oligopolistic rms into the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model with a
CES utility function, they show that an increase in the number of oligopolis-
tic rms lowers the number of monopolistically competitive goods, but raises
welfare. Parenti (2018) also derives the same nding in a quadratic utility
model that allows for multi-product oligopolistic rms. While these papers
assume that oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive rms coexist in
the same industry, we consider a dierent situation in which oligopolistic and
monopolistically competitive industries coexist.
The second related literature is about the GOLE model of Neary (2003,
2016).2 As briey mentioned above, Neary (2003) develops a baseline model
in which Cournot competition prevails in a continuum of industries, and the
factor price is endogenously determined so that the factor market clears.
Neary (2003) shows that an increase in the oligopolistic rms improves wel-
fare, and Neary (2016) extends the model to a two-country world to examine
the patterns of and gains from trade. We use a variant of this model for
at least two reasons. For one thing, this approach resolves the diculties
arising in general equilibrium analysis with imperfect competition, e.g. non-
existence of equilibrium. For another thing, because all the endogenous vari-
ables can be explicitly solved, comparative statics is easier than the model
of Shimomura and Thisse (2012). We do not claim that the GOLE model
is superior to the models of Shimomura and Thisse (2012), but our model
hopefully provides a supplementary framework that examines the eects of
entry under the coexistence of oligopolistic and monopolistic competition.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model, and Section
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3 examines the eects of entry of oligopolistic rms on the wage rate, product
price, the number of monopolistically competitive goods, the prots in the
oligopolistic industries, and welfare. Section 4 discusses a few closely related
issues. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Suppose a continuum of goods on a unit interval [0; 1]. Good z is hori-
zontally dierentiated and supplied by monopolistically competitive rms if
z 2 [0; ez], and supplied by Cournot oligopolistic rms if z 2 [ez; 1]. All goods
are produced from labor. The marginal labor requirement is denoted by c(z),
and the xed labor requirement for each monopolistically competitive rm
is given by f(z) > 0. We describe consumer behavior, and then proceed to
rm behavior and general equilibrium.
2.1 Consumer Behavior
We assume a representative consumer whose utility function is given by
U =
Z ez
0
lnX1(z)dz +
Z 1
1 ez lnX2(z)dz; (1)
where U is utility, and Xi(z); i = 1; 2 is the quantity index dened by
X1(z) 
"Z m(z)
0
xi(z)
1 1
1 di
# 1
1 1
; X2(z) 
Z n
0
xj(z)
2 1
2 dj
 2
2 1
; 1; 2 > 1:
Here, xi(z) is consumption of variety i in monopolistically competitive in-
dustry z, and xj(z) is consumption of variety j in oligopolistic industry z.
Furthermore, i; i = 1; 2 is the elasticity of substitution among varieties in
each market structure, n  2 is the number of oligopolistic rms.3 The con-
sumer chooses consumption to maximize (1) under the budget constraint:
Z ez
0
"Z m(z)
0
pi(z)xi(z)di
#
dz +
Z 1
1 ez
Z n
0
pj(z)xj(z)dj

dz = I; (2)
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where pi(z) and pj(z) are the price of each variety, and I is national income.
Denoting by  the Lagrangean multiplier attached to the budget constraint,
the rst-order conditions for utility maximization are
xi(z)
  1
1Rm(z)
0 xi(z)
1 1
1
  pi(z) = 0
xj(z)
  1
2R n
0 xj(z)
2 1
2
  pj(z) = 0:
Following Neary (2003, 2016), we choose marginal utility of income  as a
numeraire.4 The justication for this price normalization is as follows. In the
present general equilibrium model,  is an endogenous variable and depends
on the outputs that are the choice variables of imperfectly competitive rms.
However, Neary (2003, 2016) and we assume that all rms have market power
in their own product market while they treat  parametrically due to the
assumption of a continuum of industries. Then, it is no longer problematic
to set  = 1. Under this price normalization, the perceived inverse demand
function of each rm is obtained as
pi(z) =
xi(z)
  1
1Rm(z)
0 xi(z)
1 1
1 di
; pj(z) =
xj(z)
  1
2Rm(z)
0 xj(z)
2 1
2 dj
: (3)
Using these inverse demand functions, we proceed to the description of rm
behavior.
2.2 Monopolistic Competition
Given the inverse demand function in (3), a representative monopolistically
competitive rm i maximizes its prot
i(z)  pi(z)xi(z)  wc(z)xi(z)  wf(z);
where i(z) is the prot of rm i in monopolistically competitive industry z,
and w is the wage rate. Then, the price of all varieties is determined by the
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markup pricing rule:
pi(z) =
1wc(z)
1   1 : (4)
Making use of (4), the inverse demand function in (3) and the zero prot
condition i(z) = 0 jointly determine the equilibrium output and the number
of varieties:
xi(z) =
(1   1)f(z)
c(z)
; m(z) =
1
zwf(z)
: (5)
2.3 Oligopoly
The prot of each oligopolistic rm j is dened by
j(z)  pj(z)xj(z)  wc(z)xj(z);
where pj(z) is given by (3). Solving the system of the rst-order conditions
for prot maximization, the equilibrium output and price in the symmetric
equilibrium are derived as
xj(z) =
(2   1)(n  1)
2n2wc(z)
; pj(z) =
2nwc(z)
(2   1)(n  1) : (6)
2.4 General Equilibrium
Having characterized the behavior of the consumer and rms, we close the
model by introducing the labor market-clearing condition. Summarizing the
results in the previous subsections, the labor market-clearing condition is
L =
Z ez
0
m(z)[c(z)xi(z) + f(z)]dz +
Z 1
ez nc(z)xj(z)dz = ezw + (1  ez) (2   1)(n  1)2nw ;
where L > 0 is a labor endowment. Solving this equation for w yields the
equilibrium wage rate:
w =
1
L
"ez + (1  ez) (2   1)(n  1)
2n
#
=
(2 + n  1)ez + (2   1)(n  1)
2nL
:
(7)
Once the equilibrium wage is determined by (7), all the other endogenous
variables are obtained as a function of primitive parameters such as n. What
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is worth noting is that the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is guar-
anteed because the equilibrium value of endogenous variables is explicitly
solved.
3 The Eects of Entry
This section derives some comparative statics results with respect to an in-
crease in n. We begin with the eect on the wage rate, and then address
the eects on the goods prices, the number of monopolistically competitive
goods, the prots in the oligopolistic sectors and welfare. It follows from Eq.
(7) that
Proposition 1
As the number of oligopolistic rms increases, the equilibrium wage in-
creases.
Proof
Dierentiating (7) with respect to n, we have
@w
@n
=
(1  ez) (2   1)
2n2L
> 0; (8)
which leads to the proposition. Q.E.D.
When n increases, labor demand in the whole oligopolistic industry in-
creases, and hence the equilibrium wage rate rises. Although this result itself
is intuitively trivial, it has an important implication for the eects on the
other endogenous variables.
Relating Proposition 1 to Eqs. (4) and (5), an increase in n aects the
monopolistically competitive industries as follows.
Proposition 2
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As the number of oligopolistic rms increases, the product price increases,
the output of each rm is unchanged, and the number of varieties decreases
in the monopolistically competitive industries.
Because the price of each monopolistically competitive good is propor-
tional to the wage rate, it rises with n through the rise in the wage rate.
In contrast, the rise in the wage rate induces exit of monopolistically com-
petitive rms since their number m(z) negatively depends on the wage rate.
Therefore, new entry in the oligopolistic industries has an anti-competitive
eect on the monopolistically competitive industries, tending to reduce wel-
fare.
While Proposition 2 concerns the eects on the monopolistically com-
petitive industries, the eects on the oligopolistic industries are obtained as
follows.
Proposition 3
As the number of oligopolistic rms increases, the product price decreases
in the oligopolistic industries.
Proof
Substituting (7) into (6), the price of each oligopolistic goods is
pj(z) =
[(2 + n  1)ez + (2   1)(n  1)] c(z)
(2   1)(n  1)L :
Thus, dierentiating this with respect to n yields
dpj(z)
dn
=   2ezc(z)
(2   1)(n  1)2L < 0;
which establishes the proposition. Q.E.D.
When n rises, there are two channels through which the good price
changes. The rst is a partial equilibrium eect according to which an in-
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crease in n lowers the price by promoting competition. Besides, the rise
in the wage rate reported in Proposition 1 tends to raise the product price.
Proposition 3 states that the former eect dominates the latter eect, thereby
leading to a reduction in the product price of oligopolistic goods. In other
words, the entry in the oligopolistic sectors has a pro-competitive eect and
a positive eect on welfare even though the general equilibrium feedback is
taken into account.
Thus far, we have addressed the eects of entry of oligopolistic rms on
the prices of labor and products, but now consider the eects on the prots
in the oligopolistic industries. They are summarized in:
Proposition 4
As the number of oligopolistic rms increases, the prot of each oligopolis-
tic rm and the whole industry decreases.
Proof
Substituting (7) into xj(z) and pj(z) in (6), and further substitution of
the resulting expression into the denition of prot, we have
j(z) =
2 + n  1
2n2
; nj(z) =
2 + n  1
2n
:
Dierentiating these with respect to n yields
dj(z)
dn
=  2(2   1) + n
2n3
< 0;
d[nj(z)]
dn
=  2   1
2n2
< 0:
Therefore, the prot of each individual rm and the oligopolistic industry
decreases with n. Q.E.D.
The utility function assumed is quadratic and dierent from ours, Neary
(2003, p. 492) obtains the same result as above. If n increases, each
oligopolistic rm contracts output, but the industry-wide output expands.
Recalling that the product price falls (Proposition 3), this implies that the
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prot per-rm decreases as a result of an increase in n. What is seemingly
counter-intuitive is that the industry-wide prot also decreases with n, which
contrasts with the result in the partial equilibrium analysis. This is because
the negative eect on each rm's prot through the rise in the wage rate
plays a pivotal role. That is, the feedback eect in the general equilibrium
is a key behind Proposition 4.
Let us nally consider the welfare eect of an increase in n. To this end,
we now dene welfare W . Substituting the results in (5) and (6) into (1) and
rearranging terms, welfare depends on the primitive parameters as follows.
W =
Z ez
0
lnX1(z)dz +
Z 1
ez lnX2(z)dz; (9)
where the two terms in the right-hand side are
lnX1(z) =
1
1   1 ln
"
nez2n+ (1  ez) (2   1)(n  1)
#
+
1
1   1 ln
"
2L
1f(z)
#
+ ln
"
(1   1)f(z)
c(z)
#
lnX2(z) =
1
2   1 lnn+ ln
"
n  1ez2n+ (1  ez) (2   1)(n  1)
#
+ ln
"
(2   1)L
c(z)
#
:
Therefore, dierentiating these terms with respect to n, the welfare eect is
obtained as follows.
dW
dn
=
Z ez
0
d lnX1(z)
dn
dz +
Z 1
ez d lnX2(z)dn dz
=   ez (1  ez)1(2   1)
n(1   1) [(2 + n  1)ez + (2   1)(n  1)]
+
1  ez
n(2   1) +
ez (1  ez)2
(n  1) [(2 + n  1)ez + (2   1)(n  1)] : (10)
Since the rst line in the right-hand side of (10) is negative and the second
line is positive, the total eect is ambiguous. The biggest reason is that 1
and 2 are allowed to be arbitrary in (10).
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If the elasticity of substitution is the same across oligopolistic and mo-
nopolistically competitive goods, we have
Proposition 5
As the number of oligopolistic rms increases, welfare increases if 1 = 2.
Proof
If 1 = 2 = , (10) simplies to
dW
dn
=
ez (1  ez)
n(n  1) [( + n  1)ez + (   1)(n  1)] > 0;
and hence the above proposition follows. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. As noted earlier in
Propositions 2 and 3, entry in the oligopolistic industries has the opposite
eect on each industry. In the monopolistically competitive industries, the
goods price rises, and the number of varieties falls, both of which tend to
reduce welfare. In the oligopolistic industries, the goods price falls, which
tends to raise welfare. Thus, the total eect depends on which of these eects
is stronger. Proposition 5 states that in the special case with 1 = 2, the
latter eect is stronger and hence welfare necessarily improves. That is, the
pro-competitive eect and variety-expanding eect in the oligopolistic play
a dominant role in the whole eect on welfare.
However, the same is no longer valid in another case. One noteworthy
case is the situation with 2 ! 1 in which the oligopolistic goods are ho-
mogeneous (perfect substitutes). Then, Eq. (10) becomes
dW
dn
=
ez (1  ez) (1   n)
(1   1)n(n  1) (n  1 + ez) ;
the sign of which is positive if and only if  > n. If this inequality is satised,
the positive eect on the oligopolistic industries becomes stronger than the
negative eect on the monopolistically competitive industries. It is beyond
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the scope of this paper, but quite interesting to investigate whether the above
inequality is supported by empirical evidence.
4 Discussion
This section provides a few discussions that are relevant but not addressed
in the previous sections.
4.1 Variable Markup
The preceding analysis has used the CES sub-utility function, which yields
the constant markup. However, reecting the recent evidence suggesting
variable markups, there is a growing literature in theoretical industrial or-
ganization and international trade that produces variable markups. To our
knowledge, two approaches have progressed. The rst approach assumes
an oligopoly instead of monopolistic competition, but keeps the assumption
of the CES function.5 Under this specication, the perceived elasticity of
demand depends not only on i in our notation but also on the share of
each rm. Accordingly, the markup becomes variable. The second approach
replaces the assumption of the CES function, but the market structure con-
tinues to be monopolistically competitive. Ottaviano et al. (2002), Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008), Behrens and Murata (2007), Zhelobodko et al. (2012),
d'Aspremont and Ferreira (2016), Parenti et al. (2017), Bertoletti and Etro
(2017) and Mrazova and Neary (2017), Feenstra (2018) and Arkolakis et al.
(2018) are the important contributions of this eld.6
Even if the markup is allowed to be variable, it is conjectured that most of
the foregoing arguments are valid. An increase in the number of oligopolistic
rms leads some rms to exit and the incumbents to charge a higher product
price due to the increased wage rate. In contrast, because the familiar pro-
competitive eect is stronger than the eect on the wage rate, the product
price of oligopolistic goods will fall. As a result of these competing eects,
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it is generally ambiguous whether entry in the oligopolistic industries raises
welfare. Though these arguments are expected to survive other formulations,
it is quite dicult to do it as the next subsection shows.
4.2 Quadratic Sub-utility Model
As is just mentioned, some papers have introduced a non-CES preference in
order to produce variable markups. This direction of research is promising,
but we now briey show that it is quite dicult even if the simplest model of
quadratic sub-utility is used. Concretely, let us consider the following utility
function.7
U =
Z ez
0
u1(z)dz +
Z 1
ez u2(z)dz;
where ui(z); i = 1; 2 is sub-utility from consuming the monopolistically com-
petitive goods and oligopolistic goods, respectively, and dened by
u1(z)  
Z m(z)
0
xi(z)di  
2
Z m(z)
0
xi(z)
2di  
2
"Z m(z)
0
xi(z)di
#2
u2(z)  
Z n
0
xj(z)dj   
2
Z n
0
xj(z)
2dj   
2
Z n
0
xj(z)dj
2
;
where ;  and  are positive constants. This model oers a useful alternative
to the CES sub-utility model in the sense that demand functions are linear
and markups are variable. However, the equilibrium wage rate can not be
explicitly solved, and hence comparative statics becomes drastically dicult.
4.3 Dierent Numbers of Oligopolistic Firms
We have made an extreme assumption that the number of rms is the same
in all oligopolistic industries. Then, it is natural to ask what can be said
if the number of rms diers within the oligopolistic industries. One way
to address this question is to split the whole oligopolistic sector into a sub-
sector with n2 rms and a subsector with n3 rms. And, assume that n2
rms compete in  2 [0; 1] fraction of the whole oligopolistic sector, and that
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n3 rms compete in the (1  ) fraction. Then, our model above is given by
a special case with  = 1.8 Then, making the manipulations parallel with
those in the previous sections, we have
dW
dn2
=
Z ez
0
d lnX1(z)
dn2
dz +
Z ez+(1 ez)ez d lnX2(z)dn2 dz +
Z 1
ez+(1 ez) d lnX3(z)dn2 dz
=   ez (1  ez)1(2   1)n3
(1   1)n2
+(1  ez) " 1
(2   1)n2 +
ez2n3 + (1  ez) (2   1)(1  )(n3   1)
(n2   1)
#
 (1  ez)2 (2   1)(1  )n3
n2
;
where
  ez2n2n3 + (1  ez) (2   1)[n3(n2   1) + (1  )n2(n3   1)] > 0:
In this case, an increase in n2 (the number of rms in  fraction of the whole
oligopolistic industry) has an anti-competitive eect on the (1  ) fraction
of the whole oligopolistic industry as well as the monopolistically competitive
industries. Consequently, the eect on welfare becomes more complicated.
More seriously, it is unclear whether entry modeled above raises welfare even
if the elasticity of substitution is the same in all industries.
5 Conclusion
Constructing a general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive
and oligopolistic industries coexisting, we have investigated the eects of en-
try in the oligopolistic industries. We have shown that the market-clearing
wage rate rises with the number of oligopolistic rms, and that this eect
signicantly aects the endogenous variables in the monopolistically compet-
itive industries, income distribution and welfare. Concretely, the goods price
rises and the number of varieties falls in the monopolistically competitive in-
dustries, which tends to have a negative eect on welfare. On the other hand,
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the goods price falls in the oligopolistic industries, which tends to raise wel-
fare. The total eect on welfare is therefore ambiguous, depending on which
of these eects is stronger. We have demonstrated that welfare necessarily
improves in the case with the same elasticity of substitution across oligopolis-
tic and monopolistically competitive industries. Furthermore, we have shown
that the prot of each oligopolistic rm and the whole oligopolistic industry
decreases as a result of entry.
We hopefully think that this paper contributes to literature in two re-
spects. First, we have established a few new results. Particularly, we have
shown that the welfare eect of entry in the oligopolistic industries is not
always positive. Second, we have provided a tractable model that has many
potential applications. As mentioned earlier, it is novel that the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium is ensured, and that all the endogenous vari-
ables are given by a function of primitive parameters. One direction is to
apply our model to international trade to address whether trade liberaliza-
tion raises welfare. However, we admittedly recognize the limitations. While
three of them (variability of markups, other types of models and the dierent
numbers of rms) are commented in Section 4, we must improve our analysis
further. For example, it is challenging but fruitful to endogenize ez by embed-
ding the argument of Melitz' (2003) type. And, it is important to examine
our theoretical prediction with empirical research.
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Notes
1. However, we note that there is a counter-example. For example, Lahiri
and Ono (1988) demonstrate that when ecient and inecient rms coexist,
entry of inecient rms can reduce welfare.
2. The rst working paper version of Neary (2016) was released in 2002.
Colacicco (2015) is a comprehensive survey.
3. For the time being, we assume that n is the same in all oligopolistic
industries. The case with dierent numbers of rms is commented in Section
4.
4. This choice of numeraire is familiar in the literature of the GOLE; see
Colacicco (2015).
5. See, for instance, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond et al. (2015).
6. See Thisse and Ushchev (2018) for an up-to-date survey.
7. See Ottaviano et al. (2002), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Parenti
(2018) for the applications of this utility function.
8. An alternative way is to assume a more general situation in which the
number of rms is n(z).
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